Storbeck, Justin; Clore, Gerald L.
Psychological Science, 16, 785-791.
The Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm lures people to produce false memories. Two experiments examined whether induced positive or negative moods would influence this false memory effect. The affect-as-information hypothesis predicts that, on the one hand, positive affective cues experienced as task-relevant feedback encourage relational processing during encoding, which should enhance false memory effects. On the other hand, negative affective cues are hypothesized to encourage item-specific processing at encoding, which should discourage such effects. The results of Experiment 1 are consistent with these predictions: Individuals in negative moods were significantly less likely to show false memory effects than those in positive moods or those whose mood was not manipulated. Experiment 2 introduced inclusion instructions to investigate whether moods had their effects at encoding or retrieval. The results replicated the false memory finding of Experiment 1 and provide evidence that moods influence the accessibility of lures at encoding, rather than influencing monitoring at retrieval of whether lures were actually presented.
Friday, September 23, 2005
ARTICLE UPDATE - Attentional Inhibition Has Social-Emotional Consequences for Unfamiliar Faces
Fenske, Mark J.; Raymond, Jane E.; Kessler, Klaus; Westoby, Nikki; Tipper, Steven P.
Psychological Science, 16, 753-758
Visual attention studies often rely on response time measures to show the impact of attentional facilitation and inhibition. Here we extend the investigation of the effects of attention on behavior and show that prior attentional states associated with unfamiliar faces can influence subsequent social-emotional judgments about those faces. Participants were shown pairs of face images and were asked to withhold a response if a transparent stop-signal cue appeared over one of the faces. This served to associate the cued face with an inhibitory state. Later, when asked to make social-emotional choices about these face pairs, participants chose uncued faces more often than cued faces as “more trustworthy” and chose cued faces more often than uncued faces as “less trustworthy.” For perceptual choices, there was no effect of how the question was framed (which face is “on a lighter background” vs. “on a darker background”). These results suggest that attentional inhibition can be associated with socially relevant stimuli, such as faces, and can have specific, deleterious effects on social-emotional judgments.
Psychological Science, 16, 753-758
Visual attention studies often rely on response time measures to show the impact of attentional facilitation and inhibition. Here we extend the investigation of the effects of attention on behavior and show that prior attentional states associated with unfamiliar faces can influence subsequent social-emotional judgments about those faces. Participants were shown pairs of face images and were asked to withhold a response if a transparent stop-signal cue appeared over one of the faces. This served to associate the cued face with an inhibitory state. Later, when asked to make social-emotional choices about these face pairs, participants chose uncued faces more often than cued faces as “more trustworthy” and chose cued faces more often than uncued faces as “less trustworthy.” For perceptual choices, there was no effect of how the question was framed (which face is “on a lighter background” vs. “on a darker background”). These results suggest that attentional inhibition can be associated with socially relevant stimuli, such as faces, and can have specific, deleterious effects on social-emotional judgments.
Saturday, September 17, 2005
ARTICLE UPDATE - The role of spatial frequency information for ERP components sensitive to faces and emotional facial expression
Amanda Holmes, Joel S. Winston and Martin Eimer
Cognitive Brain Research, 25, 508-520
To investigate the impact of spatial frequency on emotional facial expression analysis, ERPs were recorded in response to low spatial frequency (LSF), high spatial frequency (HSF), and unfiltered broad spatial frequency (BSF) faces with fearful or neutral expressions, houses, and chairs. In line with previous findings, BSF fearful facial expressions elicited a greater frontal positivity than BSF neutral facial expressions, starting at about 150 ms after stimulus onset. In contrast, this emotional expression effect was absent for HSF and LSF faces. Given that some brain regions involved in emotion processing, such as amygdala and connected structures, are selectively tuned to LSF visual inputs, these data suggest that ERP effects of emotional facial expression do not directly reflect activity in these regions. It is argued that higher order neocortical brain systems are involved in the generation of emotion-specific waveform modulations. The face-sensitive N170 component was neither affected by emotional facial expression nor by spatial frequency information.
Cognitive Brain Research, 25, 508-520
To investigate the impact of spatial frequency on emotional facial expression analysis, ERPs were recorded in response to low spatial frequency (LSF), high spatial frequency (HSF), and unfiltered broad spatial frequency (BSF) faces with fearful or neutral expressions, houses, and chairs. In line with previous findings, BSF fearful facial expressions elicited a greater frontal positivity than BSF neutral facial expressions, starting at about 150 ms after stimulus onset. In contrast, this emotional expression effect was absent for HSF and LSF faces. Given that some brain regions involved in emotion processing, such as amygdala and connected structures, are selectively tuned to LSF visual inputs, these data suggest that ERP effects of emotional facial expression do not directly reflect activity in these regions. It is argued that higher order neocortical brain systems are involved in the generation of emotion-specific waveform modulations. The face-sensitive N170 component was neither affected by emotional facial expression nor by spatial frequency information.
Thursday, September 15, 2005
ARTICLE UPDATE - An emotional mediation theory of differential age effects in episodic and semantic memories
Allen PA, Kaut KP, Lord RG, Hall RJ, Grabbe JW, Bowie T.
Experimental Aging Research,31,355-91
Although there is a large decrement in central episodic memory processes as adults age, there is no appreciable decrement in central semantic memory processes (Allen et al., Journal of Gerontology: Psychological Sciences, 57B, P173-P186, 2002; Allen et al., Experimental Aging Research, 28, 111-142, 2002; Mitchell, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 15, 31-49, 1989). The authors develop a theory of episodic memory's connections to cognitive, emotional, and motivational systems to explain these differential age effects. The theory is discussed within the context of the cognitive neuroscience research regarding limbic system connectivity in conjunction with Damasio's notion of somatic markers (Descartes' error: Emotion, reason, and the human brain, New York: Grosset/Putnam, 1994). The central hypothesis is that elements of limbic system circuitry, including portions of the medial temporal lobes and frontal cortex, are associated with both working and long-term episodic memory performance, and by extension, with the capacity to engage in emotion-guided, self-regulatory processes that depend heavily on episodic memory. In contrast, the semantic memory system may have less shared interface with episodic and affective networks (i.e., the limbic-related system), and therefore remain independent of neurocognitive changes impacting emotional states and episodic-type memory processes. Accordingly, this framework may account for the pattern of age-related declines in episodic relative to semantic memory, particularly if older adults experience less emotional activation, and therefore fewer somatic markers, than younger adults. An initial empirical examination of this emotional mediation theory is presented, using preexisting data that include indicators of age, chronic tendency to focus on negative emotional stimuli (neuroticism), and working memory performance.
Experimental Aging Research,31,355-91
Although there is a large decrement in central episodic memory processes as adults age, there is no appreciable decrement in central semantic memory processes (Allen et al., Journal of Gerontology: Psychological Sciences, 57B, P173-P186, 2002; Allen et al., Experimental Aging Research, 28, 111-142, 2002; Mitchell, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 15, 31-49, 1989). The authors develop a theory of episodic memory's connections to cognitive, emotional, and motivational systems to explain these differential age effects. The theory is discussed within the context of the cognitive neuroscience research regarding limbic system connectivity in conjunction with Damasio's notion of somatic markers (Descartes' error: Emotion, reason, and the human brain, New York: Grosset/Putnam, 1994). The central hypothesis is that elements of limbic system circuitry, including portions of the medial temporal lobes and frontal cortex, are associated with both working and long-term episodic memory performance, and by extension, with the capacity to engage in emotion-guided, self-regulatory processes that depend heavily on episodic memory. In contrast, the semantic memory system may have less shared interface with episodic and affective networks (i.e., the limbic-related system), and therefore remain independent of neurocognitive changes impacting emotional states and episodic-type memory processes. Accordingly, this framework may account for the pattern of age-related declines in episodic relative to semantic memory, particularly if older adults experience less emotional activation, and therefore fewer somatic markers, than younger adults. An initial empirical examination of this emotional mediation theory is presented, using preexisting data that include indicators of age, chronic tendency to focus on negative emotional stimuli (neuroticism), and working memory performance.
Monday, September 12, 2005
ARTICLE UPDATE - Emotional enhancement of perceptual priming is preserved in aging and early-stage Alzheimer's disease
Kevin S. LaBar, Dana C. Torpey, Craig A. Cook, Stephanie R. Johnson, Lauren H. Warren, James R. Burke and Kathleen A. Welsh-Bohmer
Neuropsychologica, 43, 1824-1837.
Perceptual priming for emotionally-negative and neutral scenes was tested in early-stage Alzheimer's disease (AD) patients and healthy younger, middle-aged and older adults. In the study phase, participants rated the scenes for their arousal properties. In the test phase, studied and novel scenes were initially presented subliminally, and the exposure duration was gradually increased until a valence categorization was made. The difference in exposure duration required to categorize novel versus studied items was the dependent measure of priming. Aversive content increased the magnitude of priming, an effect that was preserved in healthy aging and AD. Results from an immediate recognition memory test showed that the priming effects could not be attributable to enhanced explicit memory for the aversive scenes. These findings implicate a dissociation between the modulatory effect of emotion across implicit and explicit forms of memory in aging and early-stage AD.
Neuropsychologica, 43, 1824-1837.
Perceptual priming for emotionally-negative and neutral scenes was tested in early-stage Alzheimer's disease (AD) patients and healthy younger, middle-aged and older adults. In the study phase, participants rated the scenes for their arousal properties. In the test phase, studied and novel scenes were initially presented subliminally, and the exposure duration was gradually increased until a valence categorization was made. The difference in exposure duration required to categorize novel versus studied items was the dependent measure of priming. Aversive content increased the magnitude of priming, an effect that was preserved in healthy aging and AD. Results from an immediate recognition memory test showed that the priming effects could not be attributable to enhanced explicit memory for the aversive scenes. These findings implicate a dissociation between the modulatory effect of emotion across implicit and explicit forms of memory in aging and early-stage AD.
ARTICLE UPDATE - Empathy examined through the neural mechanisms involved in imagining how I feel versus how you feel pain
Philip L. Jackson, Eric Brunet, Andrew N. Meltzoff and Jean Decety
Neuropsychologia, in press
Perspective-taking is a stepping stone to human empathy. When empathizing with another individual, one can imagine how the other perceives the situation and feels as a result. To what extent does imagining the other differs from imagining oneself in similar painful situations? In this functional magnetic resonance imaging experiment, participants were shown pictures of people with their hands or feet in painful or non-painful situations and instructed to imagine and rate the level of pain perceived from different perspectives. Both the Self's and the Other's perspectives were associated with activation in the neural network involved in pain processing, including the parietal operculum, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; BA32) and anterior insula. However, the Self-perspective yielded higher pain ratings and involved the pain matrix more extensively in the secondary somatosensory cortex, the ACC (BA 24a′/24b′), and the insula proper. Adopting the perspective of the Other was associated with specific increase in the posterior cingulate/precuneus and the right temporo-parietal junction. These results show the similarities between Self- and Other-pain representation, but most interestingly they also highlight some distinctiveness between these two representations, which is a crucial aspect of human empathy. It may be what allows us to distinguish empathic responses to others versus our own personal distress. These findings are consistent with the view that empathy does not involve a complete Self–Other merging.
Neuropsychologia, in press
Perspective-taking is a stepping stone to human empathy. When empathizing with another individual, one can imagine how the other perceives the situation and feels as a result. To what extent does imagining the other differs from imagining oneself in similar painful situations? In this functional magnetic resonance imaging experiment, participants were shown pictures of people with their hands or feet in painful or non-painful situations and instructed to imagine and rate the level of pain perceived from different perspectives. Both the Self's and the Other's perspectives were associated with activation in the neural network involved in pain processing, including the parietal operculum, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; BA32) and anterior insula. However, the Self-perspective yielded higher pain ratings and involved the pain matrix more extensively in the secondary somatosensory cortex, the ACC (BA 24a′/24b′), and the insula proper. Adopting the perspective of the Other was associated with specific increase in the posterior cingulate/precuneus and the right temporo-parietal junction. These results show the similarities between Self- and Other-pain representation, but most interestingly they also highlight some distinctiveness between these two representations, which is a crucial aspect of human empathy. It may be what allows us to distinguish empathic responses to others versus our own personal distress. These findings are consistent with the view that empathy does not involve a complete Self–Other merging.
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